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Abstract 
 
Despite its high political interest, the impact of removing user charges for health 
care in low-income settings remains a debatable issue. We try to clear up this 
contentious issue by estimating the short-term effects of a policy change that 
occurred in 2006 in Zambia, when 54 of 72 districts removed fees. We use a pooled 
synthetic control method in order to estimate the causal impact of the policy on 
health care use, the provider chosen and out-of-pocket medical expenses. We find 
no evidence that user fee removal increased health care utilisation, even among 
the poorest group. However, we find that the policy is likely to have led to a 
substitution away from the private sector for those using care and that it virtually 
eliminated medical expenditures, thereby providing financial protection to service 
users. We estimate that the policy was equivalent to a transfer of US$3.2 per 
health visit for the 50% richest but of only US$1.1 for the 50% poorest. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the past two decades, several countries have taken steps to removing user 
charges for some or all curative care services (Yates, 2009), embracing the idea 
that user fees “deter people from using health services and cause financial stress” 
(World Health Organisation, 2010). Such decisions were motivated by the 
observation that user fees can reduce utilisation of care (Burnham et al., 2004, 
Deininger and Mpuga, 2005), in particular for poorer population groups whose 
demand for care is more price elastic (Gertler et al., 1987, Sauerborn et al., 1994, 
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Gilson, 1997). In Zambia, user fee removal was justified on the grounds that user 
fees appeared to decrease equity of access to health care and increase poverty 
(Kahenya and Lake, 1994, Sukwa and Chabot, 1997, Masiye et al., 2005). Some 
researchers have further pointed that removing fees may not necessarily have the 
beneficial effects one could hope for (McPake et al., 2011, Gilson and McIntyre, 
2005). Although removing fees has the potential to improve service coverage and 
access, hasty politically-driven decisions with no prior preparation can lead to 
unintended effects, including quality deterioration due to lack of funds, excessive 
demands on health workers and depletion of drug stocks (Gilson and McIntyre, 
2005). There is some evidence from Uganda that accountability of health workers 
to the community was reduced after fees were removed (Burnham et al., 2004). In 
addition, the positive effects of removing user fees will depend on the determinants 
of the demand for health care. Economic theory indicates that removing fees will 
increase utilisation if fees represent a high financial hurdle for households. 
However, if other factors such as distance to facilities or limited perceived benefits 
of health care are the main drivers behind limited utilisation, removing financial 
barriers may have a more limited impact.  
 
Some early evidence of the effects of user fee removal in several sub-Saharan 
countries suggested that utilisation of health care services would grow after fees 
were removed (Lagarde and Palmer, 2008). A more recent review of the evidence 
on maternal services reached similar optimistic conclusions (Hatt et al., 2013). 
 However, both reviews underline the weakness of existing studies, which relied 
mostly on poor quality routine data and failed to provide a robust identification of 
3 
 
the causal impact of the policy (Lagarde and Palmer, 2008). Several recent studies 
have provided more robust evidence of the effects of free curative care through the 
(quasi) randomised introduction of health insurance, and their conclusions are less 
optimistic.1 Using the phased randomised implementation of a social health 
insurance in Mexico, King et al. (2009) found no increase in the use of health care 
services by insured individuals, even though free care drastically reduced their 
medical expenses. In Gujarat, a programme offering free deliveries to poor women 
in private facilities was not associated with a change in the probability of 
institutional delivery (Mohanan et al., 2014). Slightly more positive results 
emerged from a randomised controlled trial in Ghana (Powell-Jackson et al., 
2014), where free care resulting from the introduction of health insurance led to a 
small increase of utilisation of service (3.7 percentage points).  
 
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by presenting new evidence from 
Zambia where fees were removed in primary care facilities in 54 of the 72 districts 
in 2006. Using the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003, 
Cavallo et al., 2013), we estimate the causal impact of user fee removal on health-
seeking behaviours, provider choice, and medical out-of-pocket expenditures in the 
general population, and explore some heterogeneous effects depending on income 
level.  
                                                          
1 Although from a theoretical perspective the two interventions are equivalent (no direct cost for 
using health care services if the insurance provides a full third party reimbursement), in practice 
they have important differences. Insurance schemes often limit the number and type of health care 
providers that can be chosen by members, in a way that user fee removal does not. And there is 
also evidence that even when they are insured, more disadvantaged groups are likely to claim their 
benefits and use health insurance less (Devadasan et al., 2007) while user fee removal does not 
present any administrative obstacle to anyone.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
background and study setting. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 the 
empirical approach adopted. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 the 
robustness checks. Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Health seeking behaviours and user charges in Zambia 
before 2006  
 
From 1964 to 1991, the government of Zambia provided health care services for 
free. In 1991, user fees were introduced to raise additional income to improve 
quality of services (avoid drug stock-outs and increase staff motivation thanks to 
salary top-ups) and greater accountability to the local communities.2 User fees in 
primary care consisted of a flat consultation fee covering consultation and drugs, 
set by each district according to the ability to pay of the population (Carasso et al., 
2010). The typical level of fees at primary care level could be considered as 
relatively low (McPake et al., 2011), typically between 500 to 1,000 Zambian 
Kwachas (ZK) (about US$ 0.14 to US$ 0.27 in 2006) (Carasso et al., 2010) or 5% 
to 10% of the equivalent of a day’s average GDP/capita in 2006. Several categories 
                                                          
2 Two reports showed that user fees introduction led to a decrease in utilization (Sukwa and Chabot, 1997; 
Kahenya and Lake, 1994). 
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of individuals were exempted from paying fees: patients under 5 and over 65 years 
old, pregnant women, those suffering from certain diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS, TB), 
and indigents (identified by local communities). In practice, children and elderly 
people made up the majority of exemptions (respectively 66% and 7% of all 
exemptions in 1998).  
 
With rapid economic growth and the development of its public health care system, 
Zambia experienced a sharp increase in the proportion of sick individuals seeking 
modern care, from 35.89% in 1998 (Central Statistical Office, 1999) to 57.31% in 
2004 (Central Statistical Office, 2005). In 2004, 56% of individuals reporting an 
episode of illness sought modern care, 17% did not do anything and 27% chose self-
medication, usually meaning that they went to drug stores to obtain over-the-
counter medicines. Among those who sought care, 82% of individuals went to a 
government facility, 8% to mission providers, 6% to private providers, 1% to 
traditional practitioners and 3% to other providers.  
  
2.2. The 2006 policy change  
 
On January 13th 2006, the Zambian president announced that user fees in 
primary health care were to be removed in rural areas as a first step towards 
universal access for all (Carasso et al., 2010). The policy would apply to publicly-
funded facilities, which included both government-run as well as mission facilities. 
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Facilities could still charge two categories of patients: those coming from outside 
of the catchment area and foreigners.3  
 
Following the Presidential announcement, a directive was sent to all districts in 
March 2006 stating that the policy would apply to all primary health care facilities 
located in rural areas, everywhere in the country. However, due to multiple 
challenges to clearly define rural areas, the government changed the definition of 
the policy at the last moment, and on 1st April 2006 all primary care facilities 
located in the 54 districts designated as “rural” according to the local government 
classification were asked to remove user fees. Some confusion ensued at the 
beginning of the policy change, with local authorities not always clear about the 
remits of the policy (Carasso et al., 2010). 
 
To help prevent potential negative effects due to the loss of user fee revenue at 
facility level, facilities would be compensated through an earmarked monthly 
grant, to be paid by each district. These compensation grants were loosely linked 
to actual utilisation of health care services since they were based on projected 
income loss calculated by each district, based on 2005 routine data (Government 
of the Republic of Zambia, 2006). The payment of these grants, funded by a 
bilateral donor, ended up being compromised by several factors. Essentially, the 
funds were released to the Zambia Treasury only in August 2006, and they only 
reached rural districts between December 2006 and March 2007. Furthermore, in 
                                                          
3 The policy change was later scaled up to other areas. In January 2007, user fees were removed 
in all public health facilities located in the peri-urban areas of the remaining 18 urban districts. 
Finally, in January 2012, user fees were removed everywhere else.  
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the absence of clear guidelines on how to use this additional funding, district 
authorities followed different approaches: some facilities received monthly 
payments, while others received lump-sum payments or no grant at all (Carasso 
et al., 2010). 
 
In addition to the lack of replacement funds, the 2006 policy change was 
introduced in a particularly challenging year for funding to primary health care 
facilities, as there was a 40%-reduction in funding to district primary health care 
(Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2007). In effect, this meant that primary 
care facilities experienced a double loss in revenue, from the district basket as well 
as from user fees. 
 
Due to these implementation challenges, user fees were not effectively abolished 
for everyone in rural areas. According to national household survey data, six 
months after the official introduction of the free care policy in rural districts, 29% 
of patients aged between 5 and 65 years were still paying for receiving care in a 
government-run or mission health centre. Yet this still represented a sharp 
decrease compared to 2004, where 64% of the same population would be charged 
for health care services. 
 
2.3. Anticipated effects 
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Basic economic theory suggests that a decrease in price will increase the demand 
for health care services through an income effect and a substitution effect. In the 
Zambian context, the income effect would allow more people to use public health 
care services, while the change in the relative prices of different care seeking 
options would lead to a substitution away from private health providers (Gertler 
and Gaag, 1990). However, these effects would only occur if the demand for public 
health care services is sensitive to price and if the perceived quality of care 
remains unchanged. Both assumptions are potentially problematic in the case of 
Zambia. There are reasons to believe that changes in prices happened in 
conjunction with changes in quality of care and that the perceived quality of care 
diminished. Indeed, in Zambia, the health financing reform took place against the 
backdrop of a critical shortage of health workers, which affected particularly 
remote and rural areas (Carasso et al., 2012, McPake et al., 2013). As a result, it 
is possible that populations in rural areas would expect relatively low quality of 
services in the public sector, mitigating their valuation of these services.  
 
 
2.4. Existing evidence 
 
There have been a few studies looking at the impact of removing user fees in 
Zambia. Several of these studies have been descriptive, documenting the 
implementation of the policy and the way health care providers or community 
members perceived it (Hadley, 2011, Carasso et al., 2012, Masiye et al., 2008).  
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Three studies used routine facility data to investigate the policy impact (Masiye 
et al., 2010, Lagarde et al., 2012, Chama-Chiliba and Koch, 2016). Although their 
findings are not directly comparable due to the different scope and type of data 
used, those studies generally find an increase in the number of outpatient visits 
following the policy change. Using an interrupted time-series approach, Lagarde 
et al. (2012) estimate a 40% increase in the volume of outpatient visits six months 
after the policy change in a subset of 17 rural districts, with that effect flattening 
out over time. Masiye et al. (2010) compare trends in the volume of quarterly visits 
before and after the policy change, and find that they increased in rural districts 
but not in urban districts, or for children under five. 
An additional study (Chama-Chiliba and Koch, 2016) applies interrupted time-
series on routine facility data to investigate the effect of user fee removal on 
institutional deliveries. Based on their preferred specification (Feasible 
Generalised Least Squares) these authors found that the policy only leads to an 
immediate increase in institutional deliveries of 1.2 percentage point (or 3.4%) and 
institutional deliveries did not continue to rise after this immediate increase. 
These studies may not have detected the causal impact for two reasons. First, the 
identification strategies they used are problematic. Masiye et al. (2010) caution 
that they cannot evaluate the causal impact of the policy, but rather some changes 
in trends. The validity of the interrupted time-series approach used by Lagarde et 
al. (2012) hinges on the assumption that no other concurrent factor may have 
affected the outcome of interest over the study period. Based on reports and 
anecdotal evidence of the policy change and the human resources crisis over the 
period, this assumption is debatable.  
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Second, both studies rely on facility register data which have at least two 
limitations. Firstly, they suffer from measurement errors, including not at random 
missing data and obvious inaccuracies, as indicated by Lagarde et al. (2012). 
Secondly, these routine data report the volume of outpatient consultations, which 
do not differentiate between unique visits of different patients and multiple visits 
by the same patients. In other words, the increase in the volume of consultations 
could be explained by an increase in the frequency of visits of ‘current’ users and 
not by an increase in utilisation by new users.  
3. Data 
 
Data on the study outcomes come from the Living Conditions and Monitoring 
surveys (LCMS), a repeated cross-section household survey designed to provide 
the basis for comparison of poverty estimates in Zambia over time. Each survey 
includes detailed information about health-seeking behaviours, as well as a 
variety of socio-economic variables on a nationally representative sample of the 
population. 
We make use of all surveys we could pre- and post-treatment: three waves of the 
survey pre-treatment (1998, 2002 and 2004)4 and one survey post-treatment 
(2006). For that last survey, the data collection occurred over October-November 
2006, meaning that we observe the variables of interest six months after the policy 
change. Summary statistics on the outcome measures used before and after the 
                                                          
4 Due to a change in administrative definition of districts, we could not use surveys that took place before 
1998. 
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removal of user fees are shown in Panel A of Table 1. In addition to information 
on study outcomes, we exploited data on a broad range of socio-demographic 
characteristics as detailed in Panel B of Table 1. 
 
We investigate the effect of the policy on four outcomes. First, we look at health 
care utilisation, defined as whether an individual who reported an illness episode 
the last two weeks sought modern formal care – this excludes consultation of 
traditional or church healers and self-medication, but includes private, 
government and mission facilities. Second, we consider the choice of provider of 
individuals seeking modern care. Specifically, we look at the proportion who went 
to any government-funded primary care facility5 to test whether the policy led to 
a substitution away from private-for-profit providers. Third, to estimate the effect 
of the policy on financial protection, we consider health care expenditures incurred 
by individuals at the point of care, defined as the amount of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
medical expenses (deflated and expressed in Kwachas 2006). Finally, we consider 
a potential unintended consequence of the policy, understood as something that 
was not meant by the policy change. Specifically, we look at the proportion of 
individuals who sought care and had to purchase drugs from a private pharmacist. 
This is meant to detect whether increased utilisation of public facilities led to drug 
stock-outs, a sign of poor quality of care and a cause for additional expenditures 
incurred elsewhere. 
 
                                                          
5 This is defined as an individual declaring they went to seek care in a government or a mission facility. 
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Table 1 
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1. The synthetic control method 
 
The staggered implementation of the policy change creates a natural experiment 
to analyse the effects of user fee removal. The 54 districts implementing the policy 
change in April 2006 are treatment units while the remaining 18 urban districts 
where fees are still charged constitute the donor pool (i.e. the comparison group). 
We exploit the fact that district classification was highly arbitrary since districts 
containing a city or a municipality were classified urban, while the other districts 
were classified rural. Nevertheless, looking at the distribution of the proportion 
living in rural areas (see Appendix 1), we see that on average 40% of households 
living in an urban district live in a rural area and that there exist some highly 
rural areas among the urban classified districts, which provides reassurance about 
the choice of urban districts as reasonable controls for rural districts.  
 
However, as suggested by the graphs in Figure 1, we ruled out a simple Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) approach because the pre-intervention outcome trends in the 
control and treatment groups are not parallel for most outcomes (specifically 
health care utilisation and health provider choice).6  
 
                                                          
6 Results are presented as a robustness check.  
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Figure 1 
 
An alternative method to estimate causal effects of a policy affecting one or more 
units is the synthetic control method (Cavallo et al., 2013, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie et al., 2010). This method involves constructing a 
counterfactual for the treated group (rural districts) by taking a weighted average 
of the available control units (urban districts), where a higher weight is given to 
control units that are more similar to the treated unit. This synthetic twin is 
created to follow the same pattern than the treated unit in the pre-treatment 
period so that it can be used as a counterfactual after the policy implementation.  
 
Additionally, the synthetic control is built by using the observable characteristics 
in all the pre-treatment years. Unlike matching estimators, the idea behind the 
synthetic control is that a combination of control units provides a better 
comparison for the treated unit than a single unit alone. Additionally, the 
synthetic control is built by using the observable characteristics in all the pre-
treatment year allowing the effects of the unobserved heterogeneity in the outcome 
to vary with time (Abadie et al., 2010). 
 
Since the user fees removal policy was implemented at the district level, we 
evaluate the policy at this level. Using survey sampling weights, we estimate 
mean values for all outcomes and independent variables at the district level. 
Because they already benefited from free care before 2006, we exclude from the 
analysis individuals aged less than 5 and more than 65 years old in each survey 
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wave. Based on available data, it is not possible to exclude other exempted groups 
but they represent a small proportion of all exemptions, and the exemption rules 
remain the same over the period of interest. We obtain a panel of 72 districts 
observed over three pre-treatment periods (1998, 2002, 2004) and one post-
treatment period (2006).  
Following Abadie et al. (2010), let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 be the outcome observed for district i at time 
t in the absence of intervention, for districts j=1,..., J and time periods t=1, ... , T ; 
and let the treated district i=1 be the only one exposed to the intervention only 
after To (with 1 ≤ T0 < T). Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  be the outcome that would be observed for district 
i at time t if district i is exposed to the intervention. The effect of the intervention 
for district i at time t> T0 can be defined as 𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁. Because Y1t
I  is observed 
for a treated district i=1, to estimate α1t we just need to estimate Y1t
N. 
 
To construct the counterfactual outcome in the treated district in the absence of 
the intervention 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁, the synthetic control method seeks an optimal vector of 
weights W*= (𝜔2
∗ , … , 𝜔𝑗+1
∗ )
′
 chosen to minimise the distance between pre-
intervention characteristics and outcomes for the treated districts (𝑋1) and for the 
control districts (𝑋0) (Abadie et al. 2010). Using these weights, the synthetic 
control for unit i is given by: 
 
?̂?1𝑡
𝑁 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑗=𝑗+1
𝑗=2 𝑌𝑗𝑡  for t> T0 
 
And therefore the effect of the intervention for district i=1 is: ?̂?1𝑡 =  𝑌1𝑡 − ?̂?1𝑡
𝑁 
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.  
Formally, if 𝑊 = (𝜔2, … , 𝜔𝑗+1)
′
 is a vector of weights such that 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 for 
J=2,…,J+1 and 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑗+1 = 1 , then the optimal vector W* is chosen to 
minimise the distance between 𝑋1 and 𝑋0𝑊, measured thanks to the following: 
 
‖𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊‖v =  √𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)′𝑉(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊) 
       
where V  is a diagonal positive semi-definite identity matrix of dimension (K×K) 
that minimises the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) i.e. the average 
of the squared discrepancy between the level of outcomes in the treated units and 
in their synthetic control counterpart in the pre-treatment periods.  
In addition to the pre-intervention outcomes levels, here we include the following 
district level covariates in both 𝑋1 and 𝑋07: proportion of male, proportion of 
households living in a rural area, median age, median household income, median 
household size, median distance to the health facility. 
 
Unlike the seminal case presented by Abadie et al. (2010) where there was only 
one treated unit, here the policy change affected 54 rural districts. This implies 
that we compute ?̂?𝑖𝑡 for each of the 54 treated districts. Then, to obtain a national 
                                                          
7 Note that those covariates were chosen to be included because the RMSPE is minimised under 
this specification. Given the non-parametric nature of the synthetic control method, we have run 
a sensitivity analysis on the covariates to include and the model associated with the smallest 
RMSPE was selected. More specifically, we estimated a model with no covariate as well as another 
model that includes province dummies and district population size. While the coefficients obtained 
were very close, those models lead to a higher RMSPE and higher confidence intervals and hence 
are not presented in the paper but are available from authors upon request. 
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level estimate of the policy effect, we take the average of 54 ?̂?𝑖𝑡, weighted by the 
district population size (alternative approaches are used as robustness checks). 
 
Statistical significance of the estimated effect is determined by running placebo 
tests (Abadie et al., 2010, Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Specifically, we apply 
the synthetic control method to every untreated district (urban districts) in our 
sample. This allows us to assess whether the effect estimated by the synthetic 
control for the treated districts is large relative to the effect estimated in untreated 
districts. The idea is that if the distribution of placebo effects yields many effects 
as large as the estimated effect, then it is likely that the estimated effect was 
observed by chance.  
 
4.2. Choice of control districts 
 
The selection of the units to include in the donor pool (i.e. the technical term for 
all potential control units in the synthetic method approach) is crucial in the 
synthetic control method. We should consider discarding districts from the donor 
pool whose outcomes may be affected by the policy change because this could lead 
to under-estimating its effect for two reasons. First, because the counterfactual 
outcomes for each synthetic treated district will be constructed as a weighted 
average of the outcomes of control districts, if some control districts are 
contaminated by the policy change (and have outcome levels comparable to those 
in treated districts), the policy effect will be under-estimated if these contaminated 
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control districts are given a non-zero weight. Second, because the statistical 
significance of the policy effect is evaluated against the distribution of placebo 
effects, if control districts are somehow contaminated by the policy, this will 
compromise our ability to detect that the change in the treated districts was not 
obtained by chance.  
To choose the pool of donor districts, we have to consider two potential problems. 
First, due to the confusion around the implementation rules of the policy, some 
facilities located in the rural areas of urban districts may have wrongly decided to 
scrap user charges. Figure 2A shows a map of the proportion of patients from 
urban districts aged between 5 and 65 years who declared to have received free 
care. In two districts (Kasama and Mongu), more than half of the respondents 
received free care.  
Figure 2A and 2B 
 
Second, while we assume that individuals seek care in the district where they live, 
people from urban districts could seek care in rural districts because facilities are 
closer or cheaper. Based on 1998 LCMS data,8 we find that this issue is generally 
limited (less than 4% of the population of urban districts seeking care in rural 
districts – see Figure 2B), except in three districts (Mongu, Mazabuka and 
Kasama) where respectively 25%, 18% and 12% of the population sought care in 
rural districts.  
                                                          
8 The only survey wave for which the information is available. 
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Based on this, we construct a synthetic control for each of the 54 treated districts 
by using three alternative pools of control districts: (1) all 18 urban districts; (2) 
all but two districts (Kasama and Mongu) excluded because a significant 
proportion of the population received free care in 2006; and (3) all but three urban 
districts (Kasama, Mongu and Mazabuka) where more than 10% of the population 
was declaring seeking care in a rural district in 1998. 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Effects on access to modern care 
 
Table 2 presents the estimated effects of the policy on the use of modern care, with 
the three alternative choices of control units.  
The findings in Panel A show no evidence that the policy increased health care 
use. The estimated effects suggest that there was an increase in utilisation of 
modern care by 0.7 to 1.6 percentage point (columns 1 and 2), which is not 
statistically different from zero.9 
 
Panel B presents the estimated impact of the policy on the choice of provider, 
conditional on using modern care. The policy seems to have led to some 
substitution away from the private sector, as once we account for possible 
contamination, we find that the proportion of individuals who went to a public 
                                                          
9 Placebo test graphs are presented in Appendix 2.  
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health facility increased by 8.7 percentage points. However, this effect is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level since it lies inside the placebo effect 
distribution.10  
 
Table 2 
 
5.2. Effects on out-of-pocket expenditures  
 
Turning to out-of-pocket expenditures (Table 3), the results indicate a significant 
and important impact of the policy, a reduction of out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures by 2.18 logarithm points, which is a 89% decrease11 compared to 2004 
expenditures. This effect lies outside the ‘90% confidence interval’ provided by the 
placebo effect distribution, meaning that the policy effect on financial protection 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. The reduction in out-of-pocket health 
expenses represents a saving during the last medical contact of US$2.3 (in 2006 
US$) or 7% of the monthly adult equivalent expenditure.12 
 
Table 3 
 
                                                          
10 Placebo effects are presented in Appendix 2.  
11 1-(exp(-2.177))=0.89 
12 OOPs level in 2004 was Kwatchas 9481 or 2006 US$2.58. 
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5.3. Unintended effects 
 
We now consider whether removing fees led to drug stock-outs government and 
mission facilities, leading more patients to buy drugs from private facilities  
 
The results (Table 4) show that also the policy had a negative effect on the 
likelihood of buying drugs from the private sector, we estimate a decrease in the 
probability of buying drugs from the private sector between 1.7 and 6 points 
depending on the specification. However, these effects are not statistically 
significant and are consistent with the fact that drug shortages did not occur more 
in intervention districts. 
 
Table 4 
5.4. Factors affecting the impact of the policy  
 
We now investigate whether chaotic implementation of the policy led to its lack of 
documented impact on health seeking behaviours. Figure 3 shows, for the four 
outcomes, the estimated effect against the degree of implementation of the policy 
in each district defined as the proportion of individuals not paying for primary 
care. These graphs suggest that while a better implementation of the policy is 
correlated with a greater use of publicly-funded health facilities and lower OOP 
medical expenses, there is no association between the degree of full 
implementation of the policy and its effect on health care use.  
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Figure 3 
 
We investigated this issue formally in a regression framework (Appendix 3) and 
found no significant relationship between the degree of implementation of the 
policy and its effect on health care utilisation.  
5.5. Heterogeneous effects 
 
We now explore the policy impact among the 50% poorest and the 50% richest13 
households (Table 5).14 We find that there was no increase in health care use for 
either group (panel A). However, we find that removing fees in government and 
mission facilities led the 50% richest away from private providers, with an 
increase in the probability of using a government or mission facility by about 18 
percentage points (panel B). Finally, the policy resulted in a similar relative 
decrease in OOP expenses for the rich and the poor (panel C). Because the rich use 
and spend more on health, for any episode of illness, the policy resulted in a higher 
reduction of OOP medical expenses for the 50% richest in absolute terms 
(US$3.21) compared to the 50% poorest (US$1.07).15 Once adjusting for the fact 
                                                          
13 It was not possible to split the sample by income groups more finely given the limited number of household 
in some districts (e.g. some districts do not include individuals of all quartiles, since the latter are defined at 
the national level). 
14 Note that yearly deflated total household expenditure per adult equivalent were 4.1 times greater among 
the 50% richest (US$ 377) than for the 50% poorest (US$ 92) in 2004 and that health care use was 54% for 
the 50% poorest and 59% among the 50% richest in 2004 (Appendix 4). 
15 Calculations based on applying the % reduction in OOP estimated in Table 5 to the deflated OOP medical 
expenses incurred in 2004. 
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that the fraction of the population16 that has an episode of illness and that seeks 
care is different between the two income groups, we find that, on average, the 
policy change represented a yearly government transfer worth about US$4.47 and 
US$1.13 to each individual of the richest and poorest group respectively. 
 
Table 5 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1. Match quality 
 
The validity of the synthetic control method partly relies on the quality of the pre-
treatment match, and the extent to which the synthetic districts are able to 
reproduce the pre-intervention outcomes. Appendix 5, which shows the 54 plots 
presenting the pre-intervention outcomes for each district and their twin, suggests 
that some synthetic controls were not able to reproduce the pre-trend outcomes 
perfectly. In turn, this could lead to poor estimates of the policy effect. To account 
for quality match in the estimation of the national policy effect, we weighted each 
district effect by the inverse of the logarithm of the RMSPE, effectively giving a 
higher weight to the closely matching synthetic districts (see Panel A Table 6). We 
find the same results as before.  
Next, we estimate the national effect by including only districts with high quality 
matches. We find very similar results except for health care use, where, based on 
                                                          
16 When accounting for the likelihood of being sick (equal to about 10% in the two groups), we find that about 
6% and 5% of individuals in the richest and poorest group respectively sought care in 2004 in the past two 
weeks.  
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only nine high-quality district twins, the estimated policy effect seems slightly 
higher.  
 
Table 6 
6.2. Micro data level analysis 
 
As an alternative estimation approach, we use micro-level data and combine 
difference-in-differences with propensity score matching (Heckman et al., 1998, 
Imbens, 2004) to account for the non-parallel pre-intervention trends and perform 
a kernel matching over three groups: the treated and control at baseline t0 and the 
non-treated at follow up t1. Following Blundell and Dias (2009), the matching 
estimator combined with difference-in-differences (MDiD), noted  𝛼𝑀𝐷𝑖𝐷 is given 
by:  
𝛼𝑀𝐷𝑖𝐷 = ∑{[𝑦𝑖𝑡1 − ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡0
𝑇
𝑗𝜖𝑇0
𝑦𝑗𝑡0] − [∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡1
𝐶
𝑗𝜖𝐶1
𝑦𝑗𝑡1 − ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡0
𝐶
𝑗𝜖𝐶0
𝑦𝑗𝑡0]
𝑖𝜖𝑇1
 } 𝜔𝑖 
 
where T0, T1, C0 and C1 stand for the treatment and comparison group before and 
after user fee removal, and ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐺  represents the weight attributed to individual j in 
group G (treatment or control) and time t (t0, t1) when comparing with treated 
individual i.  
The results obtained using DiD with matching, reported in Table 7, are similar to 
the ones obtained using the synthetic control method. Specifically, we find that 
there was no impact of user fee removal on the use of modern care. However, here 
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the small substitution effect (4.5 percentage points) away from the private sector 
is found significant at the 10% level (see panel B, column 6). The results also 
confirm the large and significant decrease in OOP expenditures since the policy 
led to a decrease in OOP health expenditures by 86%. Finally, the results suggest 
that there was no impact on the likelihood of buying drug from the private sector. 
 
Table 7 
 
6.3. Alternative approach to apply the synthetic control method 
with multiple treated units 
 
Here, we use an alternative method to estimate a unique national effect from 
multiple treated units. More specifically, we aggregated outcomes and covariates 
from the 54 treated units to create a single treated unit, and create a synthetic 
rural unit with the 18 urban districts. We can see from Figure 4, that the pre-
intervention trend of the synthetic rural unit perfectly overlaps the one from the 
single treated unit. The results we find (Table 8) are very similar to the ones based 
on the 54 treated units. Specifically, we find that the policy had no effect on health 
care use or on the health provider chosen. However, the result confirm that the 
policy reduced OOP medical spending by at least 85%. Note that while collapsing 
all 54 treated units into one average treated unit reduces sampling error and 
hence leads to a lower RMSPE (see Figure 4), it does not account for the fact that 
each rural district has its own specificity and that taking the average outcomes in 
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those districts could prevent from creating a counterfactual that closely accounts 
for time variant and invariant unobserved characteristics. 
 
Table 8 
 
Figure 4 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our findings indicate that the abolition of user fees in rural Zambia in 2006 was 
not associated with changes in the probability of seeking modern care in the 
population, which seems to contradict the conclusions of previous studies that 
suggested substantial increases in the volume of outpatient visits recorded in 
routine data (Masiye et al., 2010, Lagarde et al., 2012). Setting aside the 
methodological problems associated with these past studies,17 our results suggest 
that part of this increase may have come from richer patients previously seeking 
care in the private sector. Finally, we find that there was a large and positive effect 
of the policy on OOP expenditures, which decreased by nearly 90% in the 
population, indicating that there was a positive effect of the policy on financial 
protection. Due to unequal medical spending between richer and poorer groups, 
we find that although the reduction was similar in relative terms for both groups, 
in absolute terms the policy change benefited the richest, through an income 
                                                          
17 These earlier studies did not address the biases associated with reporting inaccuracies by 
facilities, or any changes in health seeking behaviours over time that were unrelated to the policy 
change. 
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transfer per medical visit of US$3.2 for them versus US$1.1 for the poorest. 
Finally, we find that despite lack of preparation, the policy change did not seem to 
have led to drug stock-outs in intervention areas. This result may be linked to 
reports of widespread shortage of drugs across the country in 2006, before the 
policy took place (Carasso et al., 2010). 
 
Our results echo other recent robust empirical studies of the effects of abolishing 
user fees on the demand for curative care in other low-income settings (Mohanan 
et al., 2014, King et al., 2009), although one study from Ghana found a slightly 
more encouraging increase of the demand by 3 percentage points (Powell-Jackson 
et al., 2014). These results are at odds with the recent experimental literature on 
the price effects of the demand for preventive health products and services (Dupas 
and Miguel, 2016). There are three main explanations for the lack of effectiveness 
of the policy change on the demand for curative health care services.  
A first explanation could be that the scrapping of official charges was replaced by 
the introduction (or increase) of informal payments, as suggested to have been the 
case in Uganda (Xu et al., 2006). However, to the extent that individuals report 
informal charges, our results reject this explanation, since we see an important 
reduction in OOP medical expenses for those visiting publicly-funded health 
facilities.  
Another potential explanation is that the demand for curative health care is price 
inelastic. This might have been possible because the level of fees was particularly 
low, and because the demand was primarily determined by other factors, such as 
indirect financial costs. This was confirmed by an analysis investigating the 
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determinants of health-seeking behaviours before 2006 (see Appendix 6). Although 
the results show a positive association between income and the probability to seek 
care, the magnitude of this effect is quite small,18 even in rural districts and among 
the 50% poorest households. In addition, data from LCMS 1998 suggest that 
indirect costs to accessing care were as important as OOP expenses. Even seven 
years after fees were abolished nationally, 11% of patients in rural areas reported 
catastrophic health expenditures19 mostly because of transportation costs, which 
represented 73% of these costs (Masiye et al., 2016).  
A final explanation is that changes occurred over the period of study, which 
changed the valuation of individuals for utilisation of health care services. The 
main suspicion was that there were changes in quality of care in rural areas over 
the period, more or less linked to the policy change. First, lack of planning and 
delays in providing adequate funding may have led to deterioration of the quality 
of services, as suggested before. The uncompensated loss of revenue from the 
removal of user fees can have important consequences at facility level where a 
significant share of fee revenue is retained to finance a proportion of staff income 
(Carasso et al., 2010). The policy change may also have exacerbated problems of 
motivation and shortages of staff in rural areas, as well as reports of deteriorating 
quality of care (Picazo and Zhao, 2009). Because of the substitution away from 
private-for-profit providers and a possible increase in the intensity of health care 
use, waiting times in health facilities may have increased. Unfortunately, in the 
                                                          
18 An increase in one point in the logarithm of deflated total household expenditures18 in adult equivalent 
(similar to an increase in one tercile in the income distribution) is associated with an increase in health care 
use by only 4.4 percentage points and a decrease in the likelihood of going to a public health facility by 3.3 
percentage points.  
19 Defined as 40% of household non-food expenditures. 
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absence of data on the quality of care we cannot disentangle whether the absence 
of evidence of effect on utilisation is mostly explained by the price inelasticity of 
the demand or a combination of an increase in demand due to the price effect and 
a downward shift in demand resulting from a poorer quality of care. 
 
In addition to the challenge to identify clearly the reasons behind the lack of effect 
found on the demand for health care, this study suffers from several limitations.  
A first limitation relates to the limited number of control units. As a result, the 
confidence intervals estimated from the placebo effects distribution are relatively 
large and might preclude a more precise estimation of effects. Still, the upper 
bound confidence interval from the placebo tests is close to the one obtained with 
MDiD presented as a robustness check.20 Besides, the synthetic control method 
remains superior to MDiD estimator since, unlike the propensity score matching 
conducted on 2004 data only, the synthetic districts are created using multiple 
pre-intervention periods, allowing us to account for unobserved heterogeneity that 
varies over time. 
Another limitation relates to the messy definition and implementation of the 
policy, resulting in the potential contamination of the control units in our dataset, 
which may have led to problems in estimating the effects of the policy (see section 
4.2). We investigated this issue further in Appendix 7. We found additional 
support for the idea that the effect on health provider choice could be under-
estimated given that, for this outcome, contaminated placebo districts were given 
a higher weight in the synthetic control. However, this was not the case for the 
                                                          
20 MDiD 90% upper bound CI=0.11. 
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other outcomes. Besides, Appendix 7 also shows that the contamination issue was 
not the reason for our larger confidence intervals since the effect of the policy was 
not stronger in contaminated urban districts. Finally, the challenges to implement 
the policy could provide an explanation of the absence of effect on utilisation. 
However, as highlighted before, a study using longitudinal health facility routine 
data (Lagarde et al., 2012) showed that utilisation peaked 6 months after the 
implementation. This suggests that the timeline we use is probably ideal to 
capture an effect on utilisation.21  
In January 2007, user fees were removed in all the facilities located in the peri-
urban areas of the 18 districts where fees had not yet been abolished.22 Later, in 
January 2012, the policy was extended to all remaining areas. A study looking at 
the financial protection conferred by the free care policy found that 29.9% and 45% 
of patients in public rural and urban health centres respectively incurred some 
expenditures (Masiye et al 2016). In a follow-up study using the same data, Masiye 
and Kaonga (2016) conclude that in 2014, “despite the removal of user fees in public 
primary healthcare in Zambia, access to healthcare is highly dependent on an 
individual's socio-economic status, illness type and region of residence“. Together 
with our findings, this suggests that user fee removal may not necessarily be the 
silver bullet to move towards greater access for the poorer population and quicker 
move towards universal coverage. Evidence from several settings also point to the 
potential disruptive effects of free care policies on health systems (e.g. drug 
                                                          
21 Unfortunately, the later scale-up of the policy does not allow the identification of medium- or 
long-term effects  
22 The remit of this scale-up, which could not be well identified in the household survey data due 
to the absence of geographic coordinates, prevented the use of the 2010 LCMS wave to assess the 
longer-term consequences of the policy. 
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shortages, staff dissatisfaction, insufficient funding, etc.), and therefore the need 
to prepare, plan and introduce complementary measures to ensure a more positive 
outcome (Ridde et al., 2012)  
 
The debate over whether low- and middle-income countries should charge their 
populations for using health care services has been highly contentious for several 
decades. This study suggests important and maybe counter-intuitive lessons for 
policy-makers, with regards to the immediate equity effects of removing user 
charges. If removing fees does not increase utilisation of services, in particular of 
the poorest, but if it effectively reduces OOP medical expenses of those using the 
services, then the beneficiaries of the policy change are those individuals who were 
already using services. The conclusion that user fee removal in Zambia was 
primarily benefiting the richer groups echoes a typical problem of policies 
promoting universal access to services in settings where initial inequalities are 
large and barriers to accessing services for the poor, multiple (Gwatkin and Ergo, 
2011). It would be interesting to know whether removing these other barriers (e.g. 
through financial or non-financial incentives) while maintaining user fees would 
be more cost-effective than removing fees.   
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Table 1: Mean in outcomes and covariates 
 
 
1998  
(n=72) 
2002  
(n=71) 
2004  
(n=72) 
2006  
(n=72) 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Panel A         
% seeking modern care when ill 0.358 0.310 0.505 0.520 0.565 0.548 0.564 0.584 
% choosing a government or mission facility* 0.778 0.898 0.829 0.910 0.862 0.905 0.832 0.957 
% buying drugs in the private sector*   0.129 0.019 0.114 0.022 0.090 0.033 
Log of deflated OOP* 6.703 6.522 5.967 4.547 6.149 5.374 6.088 3.111 
Panel B         
Proportion of male 0.496 0.492 0.489 0.491 0.498 0.494 0.490 0.487 
Median age  20.060 19.761 21.162 20.448 21.213 20.488 21.051 19.966 
Median log of total expenditures in adult 
equivalent 13.781 13.268 13.487 13.202 13.483 13.069 12.904 11.752 
Median household size 7.039 6.565 6.287 6.496 6.737 6.874 6.107 5.829 
Proportion of rural 0.311 0.885 0.303 0.905 0.299 0.807 0.260 0.798 
Median distance to health facility (km) 1.580 5.183 1.723 5.784 1.853 4.289 1.104 5.573 
Note: All values are representative at the national level as the district panel data was constructed based on sampling weights. In 2002, there was only 71 districts 
because there was no one who sought care when reporting illness in one district. *of the proportion of individuals seeking modern care 
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Table 2: Effect of user fee removal on access to modern care 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A    
Seeking care 0.007 0.016 0.014 
90% CI [-0.16; 0.13] [-0.16; 0.13] [-0.16; 0.13] 
N treated 51 51 48 
N placebo 18 16 15 
    
Panel B    
Chose government or 
mission primary care 
provider 
0.016 0.087 0.080 
CI [-0.19: 0.12] [-0.19: 0.12] [-0.17: 0.12] 
N treated 53 53 53 
N placebo 18 16 15 
Note: the 90% CI in brackets reports the 5th and 95th percentile of the placebo test distribution. Specification (1) 
is estimated using all 18 urban districts as control districts. Specification (2) excludes two districts where more 
than 50% of the population was reported to have benefited from free care in 2006. Specification (3) excludes the 
previous two districts, and a third one where more than 10% of the population sought care in a rural district in 
1998. 
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Table 3: Effect of user fee removal on out-of-pocket health expenses 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(oop) -2.177 -2.258 -2.279 
% change compared to 2004 -89% -90% -90% 
CI [-1.99; 1.56] [-1; 1.56] [-1; 1.56] 
N treated 48 49 47 
N placebo 18 16 15 
Note: the 90% CI in brackets reports the 5th and 95th percentile of the placebo test distribution. Specification (1) 
is estimated using all 18 urban districts as control districts. Specification (2) excludes two districts where more 
than 50% of the population was reported to have benefited from free care in 2006. Specification (3) excludes the 
previous two districts, and a third one where more than 10% of the population sought care in a rural district in 
1998. 
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Table 4: Effect on the proportion of individuals who bought drugs in 
private pharmacies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Bought from a 
private drug 
provider 
-0.060 -0.043 -0.017 
CI [-0.24; 0.19] [-0.24; 0.19] [-0.24; 0.19] 
N treated 51 49 50 
N placebo 18 16 15 
Note: the 90% CI in brackets reports the 5th and 95th percentile of the placebo test distribution. Specification (1) 
is estimated using all 18 urban districts as control districts. Specification (2) excludes two districts where more 
than 50% of the population was reported to have benefited from free care in 2006. Specification (3) excludes the 
previous two districts, and a third one where more than 10% of the population sought care in a rural district in 
1998. 
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Table 5: Effect of the policy by income groups 
 
 50% Poorest  50% Richest 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: % seeking care        
Estimated effect -0.011 0.031 0.035  -0.022 0.013 0.009 
CI [-0.31; 0.32] [-0.31; 0.32] [-0.31; 0.32]  [-0.182 ; 0.149] [-0.182 ; 0.149] [-0.182 ; 0.149] 
N treated 53 54 51  51 48 51 
N placebo 18 16 15  18 16 15 
Panel B: % choosing government or mission provider      
Estimated effect 0.007 0.059 0.064  0.034 0.181 0.153 
CI [-0.11 ;0.08] [-0.11 ; 0.05] [-0.10 ; 0.05]  [-0.22; 0.16] [-0.22; 0.15] [-0.16; 0.15] 
N treated 47 47 47  50 50 49 
N placebo 17 15 14  18 16 15 
Panel C: Ln(oop)        
Estimated effect -1.573 -1.694 -1.720  -2.298 -2.413 -2.624 
% change -79% -82% -82%  -90% -91% -93% 
CI [-2.59; 3.08] [-2.05; 3.08] [-2.05; 3.08]  [-2.01 ; 1.79] [-2.01 ; 1.79] [-2.01 ; 1.79] 
N treated 49 50 50  50 50 51 
N placebo 18 16 15  17 15 14 
Panel D: % buying drugs in the private sector 
Estimated effect 0.007 0.009 0.010  -0.261 -0.271 -0.120 
CI [-0.08;0.12] [-0.08;0.12] [-0.08;0.12]  [-0.32; 0.16] [-0.31; 0.16] [-0.31; 0.11] 
N treated 52 49 47  45 49 45 
N placebo 18 16 15  18 16 15 
Note: the 90% CI in brackets reports the 5th and 95th percentile of the placebo test distribution. Specification (1) and (4) are estimated using all 18 urban districts as control 
districts. Specifications (2) and (5) exclude two districts where more than 50% of the population was reported to have benefited from free care in 2006. Specifications (3) and 
(6) exclude the previous two districts, and a third one where more than 10% of the population sought care in a rural district in 1998. 
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Table 6: Effects accounting for pre-treatment match quality 
 
 Seek care Public 
facility 
OOP medical 
expenses 
Private 
drug 
seller 
Panel A: Weighted average by the logarithm of the inverse of the RMSPE 
Estimated effect 0.007 0.016 -2.177 -0.062 
 
Panel B: Restricting the sample to high quality matches 
Number of perfect matches 9 19 13 28 
National effect weighted by 
district size 
0.042 0.024 -2.085 -0.080 
Note: perfect quality matches means that RMSPE<0.01 for binary outcomes and <0.001 for 
ln(OOP).
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Table 7: Effects of user fee removal using individual level data 
 
 (1)  
Simple DiD model 
 (2)  
Matching and DiD (MDiD) 
 Diff (T-C) 
Baseline 
Diff (T-C) 
Follow-up 
DiD  
Diff (T-C) 
Baseline 
Diff (T-C) 
Follow-up 
DiD 
Panel A:          % seeking care        
Estimated effect -0.020 0.026 0.046  0.023 0.059*** 0.036 
SE (0.025) (0.034) (0.034)  (0.023) (0.04) (0.045) 
N  10,295 7,841 18,136  9,711 6,859 16,570 
Panel B:          % choosing   government or mission 
provider 
     
Estimated effect 0.036 0.110*** 0.075***  0.026 0.072*** 0.045* 
SE (0.024) (0.026) (0.024)  (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) 
N  5,975 4,817 10,792  5,685 4,259 9,944 
Panel C:         Ln(oop)        
Estimated effect -0.771** -2.755*** -1.985***  -0.195 -2.141*** -1.946*** 
% change -53.8% -93.7% -86.3%  -17.7% -88.2% -85.7% 
SE (0.370) (0.467) (0.367)  (0.161) (0.165) (0.374) 
N  8,620 6,806 15,426  8,144 6,016 14,170 
Panel D:          % buying drugs in the private sector      
Estimated effect -0.139*** -0.168*** -0.029  -0.052 -0.077** -0.025 
SE (0.052) (0.050) (0.038)  (0.046) (0.036) (0.043) 
N  8,589 6,791 15,380  8,127 6,003 14,130 
Notes: The propensity score was estimated using the same covariates at the individual level than the ones used in the synthetic control. Survey sampling weights are used. SE 
clustered at the district level in bracket. Estimated presented in (2) are based on propensity score matching using Epanechnikov kernel weights. * statistically significant at the 
1% statistical significance level ** at the 5% significance level and *** at the 10% significance level. 
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Table 8: Results from the synthetic control method with a single treated 
unit 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Seek care -0.018 -0.010 -0.013 
 [-0.16; 0.13] [-0.16; 0.13] [-0.16; 0.13] 
Chose government or mission 
provider 
0.029 0.094 0.088 
 [-0.19: 0.12] [-0.19: 0.12] [-0.17: 0.12] 
OOP medical expenses -1.895 -2.078* -2.086* 
 [-1.99; 1.56] [-1.00; 1.56] [-1.00; 1.56] 
% change -85.0% -87.5% -87.6% 
Purchase of private drugs -0.036 0.012 0.014 
 [-0.24; 0.19] [-0.24; 0.19] [-0.24; 0.19] 
Note: 90% CI in brackets.  Specification (1) is estimated using all 18 urban districts as control districts. 
Specification (2) excludes two districts where more than 50% of the population was reported to have benefited 
from free care in 2006. Specification (3) excludes the previous two districts, and a third one where more than 
10% of the population sought care in a rural district in 1998.
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Figure 1: Trends in outcomes 
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Figure 2A: Implementation in urban districts    Figure 2B: Proportion of urban populations who 
sought care in a rural district    
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Figure 3: Relationship between the impact of the policy and its degree of implementation 
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Figure 4: Synthetic control and treated unit trends by outcome and donor pools23 
 
 
                                                          
23 The graphs are based on specification (2) but graphs for specification (1) and (3) lead to similar pre-intervention trends for the synthetic control and treated units.  
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Appendix 1: Proportion living in rural areas in urban and rural districts 
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Appendix 2: Placebo effects 
 
(1) 18 controls (2) 16 controls (3) 15 controls 
   
Notes: The graph displays in black the national effect averaged across treated (rural) districts and in grey the effect of the policy in each control (urban) district. 
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Appendix 3: Determinants of effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are adjusted by district size. * Statistically significant at the 1% statistical significance level ** at the 5% significance level and *** at the 10% 
significance level. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Effect on seek care Effect on public facility 
use 
Effect on ln(oop) Effect on drugs bought in 
private 
 coef se coef se coef se coef se 
Degree of implementation 0.028 (0.164) 0.216*** (0.067) -4.399*** (0.926) -0.300 (0.216) 
Median distance to facility -0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) -0.030 (0.031) 0.005 (0.004) 
Median income 0.016 (0.047) 0.011 (0.022) 0.303 (0.513) 0.035 (0.051) 
Median age -0.028 (0.019) 0.004 (0.007) 0.170 (0.160) 0.002 (0.021) 
Population density -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.019 (0.014) 0.001 (0.001) 
Rural location -0.494** (0.198) -0.000 (0.137) 2.110 (2.204) 0.100 (0.264) 
Copperbelt (ref : Central) 0.059 (0.077) 0.020 (0.053) 0.543 (0.454) 0.017 (0.075) 
Eastern  0.150* (0.085) -0.069 (0.062) -0.455 (1.099) 0.016 (0.091) 
Luapula 0.099 (0.084) -0.053 (0.064) 0.429 (0.722) 0.118* (0.070) 
Lusaka -0.026 (0.066) -0.053 (0.054) 0.753 (0.520) 0.235*** (0.063) 
Northern 0.039 (0.065) -0.045 (0.056) 0.901 (0.680) 0.162*** (0.051) 
Northern Western 0.214*** (0.071) -0.002 (0.058) -0.553 (0.635) 0.100 (0.076) 
Southern 0.081 (0.074) -0.003 (0.057) 0.540 (0.705) 0.120 (0.074) 
Western 0.072 (0.089) -0.032 (0.076) 0.398 (0.865) 0.084 (0.100) 
Constant 0.707 (0.785) -0.245 (0.380) -8.451 (8.317) -0.529 (0.814) 
Observations 51  53  49  49  
R-squared 0.309  0.306  0.604  0.405  
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Appendix 4: Descriptive statistics for 50% poorest and 50% richest in 2004 (n=72) 
 50% poorest 50% richest 
 Mean SE Mean SE 
Seeking modern care (%) 0.542 0.018 0.594 0.018 
Went to a public health facility (%) * 0.917 0.014 0.896 0.016 
Deflated out-of-pocket medical expenditures (USD) * 1.349 0.208 3.569 0.742 
Bought drugs from the private sector (%) * 0.027 0.009 0.044 0.009 
Yearly deflated total household expenditure per adult equivalent (USD) 92.424 1.709 376.782 8.987 
Distance to facility (km) 6.145 0.450 4.543 0.355 
Household size  6.696 0.123 7.909 0.137 
Living in rural location (%) 0.779 0.033 0.595 0.034 
 Note: All values are representative at the national level as the district panel data was constructed based on sampling weights. *of the proportion of individuals 
seeking modern care 
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Appendix 5: Pre-intervention match quality  
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Choice of government or mission facilities 
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ln(OOP) 
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Purchase of drugs in a private pharmacy
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Appendix 6: Determinants of health seeking behaviours prior user fee removal 
 
 Sought care  Chose a government or mission facility 
 (1)  
Whole sample 
(2) 
Rural districts 
(3) 
50% poorest 
 (4)  
Whole sample 
(5) 
Rural districts 
(6) 
50% poorest 
              
 coef se coef se coef se  coef se coef se coef se 
Age  -0.001** (0.000) -0.0004 (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.0005** (0.000) -0.0003 (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
Male 0.005 (0.009) 0.006 (0.011) 0.012 (0.012)  -0.023*** (0.007) -0.021** (0.009) -0.025** (0.010) 
Household size 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)  0.001 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
Log deflated 
expenditures in adult 
equivalent 
0.044*** (0.005) 0.041*** (0.006) 0.030*** (0.009)  -0.033*** (0.005) -0.011** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.008) 
Distance to facility (std) -0.049*** (0.005) -0.054*** (0.005) -0.046*** (0.005)  -0.028*** (0.006) -0.030*** (0.007) -0.034*** (0.008) 
Rural location -0.004 (0.011) -0.022 (0.014) 0.012 (0.014)  0.060*** (0.008) 0.043*** (0.011) 0.015 (0.011) 
Copperbelt (ref : Central) 0.022 (0.017) 0.039 (0.030) 0.037 (0.023)  -0.022 (0.016) 0.011 (0.022) 0.044** (0.022) 
Eastern  0.036* (0.019) 0.053** (0.022) 0.045* (0.024)  0.050*** (0.016) 0.048*** (0.017) 0.057** (0.022) 
Luapula 0.007 (0.018) 0.016 (0.021) -0.011 (0.023)  0.046*** (0.015) 0.031* (0.017) 0.055*** (0.021) 
Lusaka 0.063*** (0.018) 0.151*** (0.025) 0.059** (0.027)  -0.029 (0.019) -0.050** (0.025) -0.001 (0.029) 
Northern -0.042** (0.018) -0.042** (0.021) -0.032 (0.022)  0.024 (0.018) -0.008 (0.021) 0.052** (0.024) 
Northern Western 0.133*** (0.020) 0.171*** (0.023) 0.134*** (0.025)  0.038** (0.017) 0.068*** (0.017) 0.031 (0.024) 
Southern 0.045** (0.021) 0.078*** (0.023) 0.058** (0.027)  0.029* (0.017) 0.008 (0.021) 0.016 (0.025) 
Western 0.100*** (0.020) 0.100*** (0.023) 0.117*** (0.024)  0.066*** (0.016) 0.053*** (0.017) 0.076*** (0.021) 
2002 (ref :1998) 0.205*** (0.011) 0.228*** (0.015) 0.210*** (0.014)  0.031*** (0.011) 0.027* (0.014) 0.011 (0.015) 
2004 0.242*** (0.011) 0.243*** (0.014) 0.261*** (0.014)  0.043*** (0.011) 0.016 (0.013) 0.023 (0.014) 
Constant -0.288*** (0.073) -0.245*** (0.088) -0.125 (0.121)  1.261*** (0.064) 0.999*** (0.079) 1.162*** (0.108) 
              
Observations 22,624  14,058  12,239   11,641  7,213  5,755  
R-squared 0.067  0.083  0.068   0.047  0.033  0.030  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 7: Potential effects of contamination on estimated impact and 
confidence intervals 
 
A: Relationship between the degree of contamination and the average weight of 
the placebo districts 
 
B: Relationship between the degree of contamination and the effect of the policy 
in the placebo districts 
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